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I n t r o d u c t i o n
After the accession of Romania, scheduled for
2007, the European Union will directly border
Moldova. As a result, the EUÐMoldova relations,
which Brussels has rather neglected so far, will
gain increased importance. The assumption be-
hind the EUÕs policy is that Moldova is not going
to join the Union, though theoretically, such
a development is not precluded. Chisinau does
indeed aspire to join the European Union.
The EU is interested in Moldova chiefly because
of the threat this country may pose to the secu-
rity of the UnionÕs future south-eastern out-
skirts. This concern about security stems from
M o l d o v a Õ s serious instability, and especially
from the existence of the separatist Transni-
strian Moldovan Republic, which is involved in
various illegal or semi-legal businesses and pro-
vides a stronghold to crime.
This paper deals with the EU policy towards
Moldova and the multiple facets of this policy,
the most important of which seems to be the
preclusion of MoldovaÕs accession in the forese-
eable future. It also discusses MoldovaÕs political
responses to the EU policy and the coun-
tryÕs own initiatives. Finally, this paper also co-
vers the legal framework of the co-operation be-
tween Brussels and Chisinau, the Communi-
tyÕs assistance to Moldova and its implementa-
tion, the EU policy towards the conflict in Trans-
nistria and the UnionÕs (current and projected)
role in its settlement as well as the plans for fu-
ture co-operation between the two sides.
I. POLITICAL RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE EU AND 
M O L D O V A
1. Legal framework
The basic treaty defining the political relations
between the EU and Moldova is the Partnership
& Co-operation Agreement (PCA) signed on 28
November 1994, in force since 1 July 19981. The
PCA replaced the Trade and Co-operation Agre-
ement (TCA) concluded between the European
Community and the Soviet Union in 1989, which
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provided legal framework for the relations be-
tween the European Communities and Moldova
in the years 1992Ð1998 2.
The PCA defined a new model for the relations
between the EU and Moldova, a model that co-
uld be described as good neighbourly relations
as part of which the Union assists its weaker
partner (by supporting democratic and market
reforms, among other measures). The option to
sign an association agreement with the EU (the
European Agreement) has not been discussed3.
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
defined mutual relations as political dialogue fo-
unded on democratic values. It introduced pro-
cedures of political dialogue between the par-
ties, set out the general terms of trade exchange
and investments, defined the legal framework of
economic, financial, legal, social and cultural co-
operation, and the ways in which the EU should
support the development of democracy and
a free market in Moldova.
The PCA upholds the most-favoured-nation tre-
atment clause introduced by the TCA and allows
for further deepening of mutual economic rela-
tions in future. The objective of the PCA is to
bring Moldova closer to the single European
market, and, in the long term, to incorporate the
country into the European free trade area.
Three bilateral institutions were established un-
der the PCA, which are supposed to meet more
less once a year. They include the Co-operation
Council (meetings at the ministerial level), the
Co-operation Committee (meetings at the senior
officials level), and the Parliamentary Co-opera-
tion Committee, composed of MPs of the Europe-
an Parliament and the parliament of Moldova4.
2. Political relations 
between the EU and Moldova 
2.1. The years 1991Ð1995
Moldova made its Declaration of Independence
on 27 August 1991. Initially, the West adopted
a rather reserved attitude towards this, and Mol-
dova continued to be viewed as a constituent of
the USSR. Concerned about the destabilisation of
international order in case the Soviet Union bro-
ke up, the EU capitals strove to prevent its disin-
tegration. The endeavours of the Romanian au-
thorities, who hoped to unite Moldova with Ro-
mania as in 19185, also received a less than en-
thusiastic reception6.
After the Soviet Union was dissolved in Decem-
ber 1991 and the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States was established, the Member States
began to recognise the independence of Moldo-
va one by one, and the European Community
acknowledged the emergence of a new state.
However, neither the Member States nor the
Community recognised the independence of
Transnistria, a separatist republic consisting of
the eastern provinces of the former Moldavian
SSR, proclaimed by Tiraspol. The Community
acknowledged the full sovereignty of Moldova in
the entire territory of the former Moldavian SSR.
At the same time, the EU called on the authori-
ties in Chisinau to respect ethnic minority rights
in the territory under their control.
In the first half of the 90s, the EU viewed Moldo-
va as a source of potential threats to the stabili-
ty of South Eastern Europe, i.e. as the locus of
the Romania-Russia and Moldova-Ukraine con-
flicts (the unsettled border issue), and the home
of Transnistrian and Gagauz separatism. Brus-
sels welcomed MoldovaÕs accession to the Com-
monwealth of Independent States, counting on
its contribution to the stabilisation of the re-
gion. The EU was reluctant to press Moscow on
the evacuation of the Russian 14th Army from
Transnistria, careful not to undermine the posi-
tion of the pro-reform and pro-western forces in
the Russian Federation. In this way, Brussels in
fact recognised Moldova as part of the Russian
zone of influence.
The referendum of March 1994, in which the
Moldovans spoke against the union with Roma-
nia and for an independent Moldova, changed
the way the EU looked at the country. Brussels
ceased to treat Moldova as a seasonal state. Mol-
d o v a Õ s international image further impro v e d
after the signature, in 1994, of the Moldovan-
Russian agreement on the evacuation of Russian
troops from Transnistria (which was never im-
plemented, though) and the solution of the Ga-
gauz separatism problem through the formation
of the autonomous republic of Gagauz-Yeri (De-
cember 1994)7.
In the early phase, the Trade and Co-operation
Agreement (TCA) concluded between the Com-
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munity and the USSR in 1989 provided a tempo-
rary framework for the relations between Mol-
dova and the European Community. Serious
works to develop a permanent institutional ba-
sis for the co-operation between the EU and
Moldova began after the Moldovan president
Mircea Snegur sent a letter to the European
Commission President Jacques Delors in Novem-
ber 1993, and after the Commission presented
its 1994 declaration assessing the situation in
Moldova. On that occasion, the Commission fo-
und that in some aspects, things were changing
for the better in Moldova. The first multiparty
parliamentary elections had been held in Febru-
ary 1994, the legislation reform had been initia-
ted, the new constitution was in the pipeline,
and liberal economic reforms and measures to
stabilise the macroeconomic situation and de-
mocratise social relations were under way8. The
admission of Moldova to the Council of Europe
was another serious step towards normalisation
of the countryÕs situation (13 July 1995).
The Council of the European Union decided to
open negotiations with Moldova concerning the
conclusion of the PCA in February 1994. The text
of the agreement was completed by the end of
June that same year9.
It should be remembered, however, that the Mol-
dova policy was a marginal thread in the foreign
policy of the European Union and its Member
States10. Moldova, too, treated the relations with
the EU as a low-priority issue for a long time. Al-
though the authorities in Chisinau developed an
interest in European integration immediately
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, no
comprehensive policy for the rapprochement
with the EU was developed for a long time. Mir-
cea SnegurÕs letter to Jacques Delors in 1993, his
letters to the European Commission President
Jacques Santer and the then Council President
Teodoros Panglos sent in January 1994 (in which
Snegur asked for the PCA to be signed as soon as
practicable), the Foreign Policy Concept of 1995
and other government programmes referring to
foreign policy showed that European integration
gradually gained importance in the concepts
and activities of the authorities in Chisinau11. Yet
government programmes in the period in qu-
estion contained only very general declarations
on co-operation with the European Union and
definitely failed to articulate a more coherent in-
tegration policy.
The rapprochement between Moldova and the
EU led to the signature of the Partnership and
Co-operation Agreement (PCA) on 28 November
1994 and the Trade Agreement on 2 October
199512. The conclusion of the PCA was especially
important Ð the agreement not only elevated
economic relations to a higher level, but also in-
stitutionalised the political relations between
the EU and Moldova for the first time, and defi-
ned the development of democratic values and
human rights as the primary objective13. The
conclusion of the PCA and the Trade Agreement
ended the start phase of the relations between
the EU and Moldova.
2.2. The years 1996Ð1998
In December 1996, new Moldovan President Pe-
tru Lucinschi sent a letter to European Commis-
sion President Jacques Santer, which contained
the first official declaration of MoldovaÕs inten-
tion to join the EU. In the years 1997Ð1998, 
leaders of the EU Member States such as France
and Germany, and countries associated with the
EU such as Romania, Hungary and Poland, wo-
uld make encouraging statements about Moldo-
vaÕs aspirations, though in many cases this was
p u rely ÒdiplomaticÓ encouragement. Member
States of the UE would generally express either
understanding for MoldovaÕs aspirations, or do-
ubt if these aspirations were realistic. The EU vo-
iced its common position in March 1998. It insi-
sted that Chisinau should be more unequivocal
about MoldovaÕs geopolitical orientation, i.e. the
choice between the EU and the CIS, and that it
should go through the initial stage of institutio-
nal rapprochement first, i.e. implement the pro-
visions of the Partnership and Co-o p e r a t i o n
Agreement that entered into force in July 199814.
On 27 October 1997, President Petru Lucinschi
sent another letter to the European Commission
President Jacques Santer, in which he asked to
enter negotiations concerning the conclusion of
an association agreement between Moldova and
the European Union. The Moldovans perceived
this as the official beginning of their countryÕs
road towards EU membership. The Moldovan Fo-
reign Minister resubmitted the request to open
association negotiations to the EU External Rela-
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tions Commissioner Hans van den Broek during
the meeting in Brussels on 3 November 1997.
Van den Broek replied that before the parties en-
ter association negotiations, the PCA should be
implemented and an interim agreement betwe-
en the EU and Moldova should be concluded. On
27 December 1997, the European Commission
President Jacques Santer endorsed the argu-
ments put forward by van den Broek by saying
that the CommissionÕs priority for the time be-
ing was to implement the PCA and make utmost
use of the co-operation possibilities provided for
by the existing legal framework.
Given this stance of the European Commission,
Lucinschi sent letters to the leaders of all Mem-
ber States asking them to back the conclusion of
an association agreement between the EU and
Moldova within the shortest timeframe possi-
ble, and to treat this as the first step on the way
towards MoldovaÕs accession. Most leaders, ho-
wever, agreed with the position of the Commis-
sion15. At that moment, the EU definitely had no
plans to open any association negotiations with
Moldova16.
Seeing Moldova against the background of the
other CIS countries in the years 1996Ð1998, the
West perceived it as a state that was successful-
ly developing a democratic system and imple-
menting market reforms. When President Bill
Clinton gave a reception in 1998 to the new Mol-
dovan Ambassador Ceslav Ciobanu, he said that
Moldova was a model democracy among the CIS
countries. In one Western study from this pe-
riod, which dealt with the progress of market re-
forms, Moldova had an average result of 4.1 po-
ints (for comparison: Russia had 4.2; Ukraine Ð
3.0; Belarus Ð 2.6; Georgia Ð 2.4, Uzbekistan Ð
2 . 2 )1 7. Indeed, in the first half of the 90s M o l d o v a
carried out all of the basic economic reforms, in-
cluding liberalisation of trade and prices, cre-
ation of the basic legal framework for a market
system, and privatisation of a portion of the sta-
te-owned sector. It also achieved some degree of
stabilisation in financial terms (by introducing
a convertible national currency and eliminating
hyperinflation), and in political terms (by hol-
ding democratic parliamentary and presidential
elections, according freedom of activities to poli-
tical parties, introducing basic civil liberties, and
finally, by passing a democratic constitution in
1994). Yet despite the market reforms, the eco-
nomy remained in a deep crisis. In the second
half of the 90s, the tempo of reforms slowed
down18. The countryÕs economic situation was
exacerbated by the Russian economic crisis of
1998. In addition, its adherence to democratic
standards was no longer as rigorous after the
Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
came to power in February 2001.
The entry into force of the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement in 1998 (see the chapter on
the implementation of the PCA and the TACIS
programme) was the most important develop-
ment in the EUÐMoldova relations in the period
in question. The factor that influenced Chisi-
nauÕs European ambitions to the greatest extent
was the Russian financial crisis in August 1998,
which exposed the weakness of the pro-Moscow
orientation to the authorities in Chisinau19.
2.3. The years 1999Ð2003
2.3.1. MoldovaÕs policy towards the EU
The year 1999 marked a short-lived pro-EU turn
in the policy of Moldova. The 1999Ð2002 govern-
ment programme of activities entitled ÒSupre-
macy of Law, Economic Recovery and European
IntegrationÓ clearly articulated the pro-Europe-
an vector in MoldovaÕs policy. The programme of
Ion SturzaÕs government appointed in March
1999 included a large-scale European integra-
tion project for Moldova, an objective that large-
ly dominated ChisinauÕs foreign policy. The pro-
ject provided for a series of diplomatic underta-
kings on behalf of Moldova in Brussels and the
Member State capitals, but also for consistent
implementation of the PCA provisions. Stu-
rzaÕs government decided that joining the Stabi-
lity Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) was
a good way to gradually integrate with the Eu-
ropean Union20. In the beginning, though, Chisi-
nau only managed to gain the status of an obse-
rver in the Pact (2000)21.
SturzaÕs government was quickly dismissed (No-
vember 1999), and with the appointment of the
Bragish cabinet, the pro-European dimension of
MoldovaÕs policy lost some significance. The
new government coalition included the commu-
nists, and European integration was no longer
a priority in the governmentÕs programme. Ne-
vertheless, some elements of the integration po-
licy developed by SturzaÕs government were pre-
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served22, and consequently, Moldova could join
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on 28
June 200123. Moldova was the first post-Soviet
country to have joined the SPSEE. This success
could not be undone by the rise to power, in Fe-
bruary 2001, of the communists, who had pled-
ged to join the Belarus-Russia Union State and
questioned MoldovaÕs pro-European aspirations
during their electoral campaign. European poli-
ticians were visibly embarrassed by the rhetoric
of the communists (e.g. their intention to re-col-
lectivise agriculture), but nevertheless the desire
to prevent the international isolation of Moldo-
va prevailed in Brussels. After joining the Stabi-
lity Pact for South Eastern Europe, Moldova was
included into the assistance programmes sup-
porting the Balkan Peninsula countries both fi-
nancially and economically24.
During the South East Europe Co-operation Pro-
cess summit in Belgrade in April 2003, its parti-
cipants accepted RomaniaÕs proposal to admit
Moldova to the organisation at the next summit
to be held in Sarajevo in 2004. The Moldovan
President Vladimir Voronin confirmed in Belgra-
de that Moldova wished for deeper integration
with European structures25.
The communists, who have been in power since
2001, gradually mitigated their firmly pro-Rus-
sian rhetoric and made some real progress, in
the international scene, towards closer co-ope-
ration with the EU. In January 2002, the govern-
ment adopted the programme for the social and
economic development of Moldova to 2005,
which gave the highest priority to the coun-
tryÕs participation in the European integration
processes26. Indeed, as far as European integra-
tion is concerned, the new governmentÕs pro-
gramme appears to be more coherent in some
aspects than that of the Bragish cabinet27. In De-
cember 2002, the National Commission for Euro-
pean Integration was established. Its tasks inclu-
de developing a European integration strategy
and co-ordinating the co-operation between va-
rious government institutions in this area. The
Commission meets regularly once in every two
or three months, and on extraordinary occa-
sions. Another government institution worth
noting is the Legislation Centre, which deals
with the alignment of the Moldovan law to Eu-
ropean standards.
2.3.2. The EU policy towards Moldova
In recent years, the EU has showed a little more
interest in Moldova. This was due mainly to the
fact that the country has been moving closer to
EU borders as a result of the upcoming eastward
enlargement. This heightened interest manife-
sted itself in the upgrading of the status of the
EU mission to Chisinau (the TACIS office was
transformed into a Delegation of the European
Commission), and in the signals that Brussels
has been sending concerning its readiness to co-
operate with Chisinau more closely on security
and justice and internal affairs. This last area in-
cludes preventing illegal migration (both the in-
flux of immigrants from the East for whom Mol-
dova is a transit country, and the job migration
of the Moldovans), and combating weapons tra-
de and trafficking in drugs and people. The exi-
sting economic assistance programmes have al-
so been upheld28.
The EU has been increasingly interested in the
issue of Transnistrian separatism. In late spring
2003, the European Union Institute for Security
Studies (ISS) presented a report suggesting that
the EU should become involved in the negotia-
tions over Transnistria. The ISS suggested that
an EUÐRussian working group should be establi-
shed to step into the OSCEÕs role as the party in
charge of the peace process in Transnistria. On
11 July 2003, information was leaked to the
press concerning talks between the OSCE and
the EU about the EU taking over the projected
peace mission in Moldova. In September 2003,
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the OSCE Chairman-in-Of-
fice and Dutch Foreign Minister, said in an ad-
dress to the US Congress that the European
UnionÕs participation in an international peace
operation in Transnistria was a Òprimary-impor-
tance problemÓ, thus officially confirming that
the EU was interested in this issue29. It should be
remembered, however, that Brussels views the
Transnistria problem in the context of the Euro-
pean UnionÕs relations with Russia. The EUÕs po-
ssible commitments in Transnistria will be car-
ried out in co-operation with Russia and will se-
rve as a test for the potential of collaboration be-
tween Brussels and Moscow on security issues30.
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2.4. Implementation of the PCA 
and the TACIS programme
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
entered into force in 1998, after it had been rati-
fied by Moldova and the EU Member States. The
TACIS-PCA programme was established to ensu-
re a more effective implementation of the PCA.
Among other measures, it helped organise a bro-
ad-scale information campaign on the PCA and
the European Union. The EU has had a positive
impact on the state reforms in Moldova. Since
the PCA entered into force, some progress has
been made in areas such as trade liberalisation,
investments and current capital flows. However,
many sections of the Moldovan law are still in
the initial phases of harmonisation with Europe-
an legislation, since the TACIS-PCA projects have
frequently stopped at the information stage, i.e.
have not gone beyond comparative analyses of
European and Moldovan legislation31.
Modernisation and Europeanisation of the Mol-
dovan law stumbles on obstacles greater than
initially expected. Works on the new Civil Code
may serve as an example. The Moldovan Parlia-
ment decided in 1994 that the existing Soviet Ci-
vil Code of 1964 should be replaced with a new
law. Legislative works were expected to be com-
pleted within just three months(!). In reality, it
took 8 years and the assistance of foreign con-
sultants, as well as funds from TACIS, GTZ, and
USAID, to complete the new Civil Code, which
was adopted only in June 2002, effective as of 
1 January 2003. The Code implemented a num-
ber of standards and principles that are guaran-
teed under international treaties or traditionally
inform the legislation of European countries. It
provided for the inviolability of property rights,
freedom of agreements, judicial protection of ci-
vil rights, and other measures32.
There were also failures, however. In 1998, the
administrative and territorial division system
was reformed in keeping with western stan-
dards. Yet when the communists came to power,
they reversed the reform in 2002 and undid
what their predecessors had achieved (e.g. by re-
storing the Soviet division into raions).
MoldovaÕs standing objective, provided for un-
der the PCA, is the conclusion of a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) between the EU and Moldova,
and the countryÕs entry into the European free
trade area33.
The implementation of the TACIS (Technical Assi-
stance for the Commonwealth of Independent
States) programme began even before the PCA
e n t e red into force. Moldova has been receiving fi-
nancial and technical assistance under the TAC I S
programme34. As the programmeÕs implementa-
tion pro g ressed, the notion of technical assistan-
c e came to be understood ever more broadly.
In the end, technical assistance was extended to
include state-of-law building processes, demo-
cratisation, development of civil society institu-
tions, and encouraging of small and medium-
-sized enterprises, etc.35
2.5. MoldovaÕs economic links 
with the EU and the CIS
The dynamics of MoldovaÕs trade with the EU on
the one hand and the CIS on the other, in the
years 1992Ð2002, (see the tables below) indicate
that the volume of commercial contacts with the
CIS was greater. At the same time, however, the-
se ties are weakening and the volume of trade
exchange with the EU is increasing. In 2002, 36.6
percent of MoldovaÕs exports were exports to
the EU and Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, most of which are joining the Union in the
upcoming years, while imports from this area
accounted for 45.9 percent of total imports. For
comparison, MoldovaÕs exports to the CIS in 2002
accounted for 54.1 percent, while imports fro m
this area, for 39.1 percent. The volume of Moldo-
v a Õ s exports to the EU has grown from 3 perc e n t
in 1992 to 23.1 percent in 2002. MoldovaÕs i m-
ports from the EU increased from 13.7 percent i n
1995 to 26.9 percent in 2002. (These figures come
f rom different, but comparable sourc e s . )
While countries of the European Union are im-
portant trade partners for Moldova, commercial
contacts with this country account for just
a fraction of the CommunityÕs external trade
exchange. In the last decade, MoldovaÕs exports
to the EU were lower not only than the average
volume of exports of the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, but also the average volume of
exports from other Newly Independent States.
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Foreign investments into the Moldovan econo-
my are definitely dominated by Russia. The only
major western investor is the Union Fenosa of
Spain, which has acquired several Moldovan
electricity transmission networks. It should also
be noted that MoldovaÕs energy sector remains
dependent on the supplies of oil from Russia and
hard coal from Russia and Ukraine.
The dependence on raw materials supplies from
Russia and, to a smaller degree, Ukraine is the
fundamental problem of MoldovaÕs economy as
far as foreign economic relations are concerned.
Russia has been supplying its energy raw mate-
rials at high prices, while not demanding imme-
diate payment. This has led to a dramatic incre a s e
of MoldovaÕs external debt. Consequently, many
Moldovan state-owned enterprises have been ta-
ken over for debts (chiefly by Gazprom), and many
others may face the same fate. Successive Mol-
dovan governments have done little to diversify
the supplies of energy raw materials, even though
they had some opportunities to do so. For exam-
ple, in the mid 90s, Chisinau rejected Roma-
niaÕs proposal for Moldova to participate in the
construction of the nuclear power plant in Cer-
na Voda, and to subsequently hire one of its re-
actors36.
MoldovaÕs difficult economic situation is a seri-
ous obstacle that impedes the countryÕs rap-
prochement with the EU. As a result of the dra-
matic economic crisis that followed the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, MoldovaÕs per capita
GDP amounted to approx. 450 US$ in the late 90s
Ð one of the lowest figures in the NIS. In the
1998 United Nations Industrial Development
Program report Moldova made it to the 104th
position in terms of civilisational development
worldwide. One of the factors in the extremely
difficult situation of the Moldovan population is
the fact that the state fails to make timely pay-
ments to its citizens.
The economic situation of Moldova therefore
restrains ChisinauÕs integration ambitions, both
because the republic is experiencing an economic
breakdown, and because it largely depends on
Russian raw materials. Its strong economic ties
with other Newly Independent States are less of
a problem Ð with an adequate policy, Moldova
could strengthen its economic links with the EU
faster. Besides, the economic relations with the
NIS may be an asset for Moldova in some
respects, from the EUÕs point of view.
2.6. A highlighted problem: migration 
Migration is a serious issue in the EUÐMoldova
relations. This is a two-faceted problem that
includes illegal job migration of the Moldovans
to countries of the EU, and the transit of illegal
migrants from the east via the territory of
Moldova.
Since the mid-90s, the Moldovans have been
active in the EU job markets. This is an impor-
tant economic factor in MoldovaÕs payment bal-
ance Ð money transfers from nationals working
abroad amounted to 70 million US$ in 1996 and
220 million US$ in 2001, equalling 1/3 of the
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2002*
2001
1998**
1996
1992
To the
European
Union
23.1%
21.6%
13.1%
10%
3%
To Central
and Eastern
European
Countries
13.5%
11%
12.8%
-
-
To the NIS
54.1%
60.5%
67.7%
-
-
Source: Anatoly Gudym, Respublika Moldova
i Evropeiski Soyuz kak partniory, Chisinau, 2002, p. 47.
* Source: The February 2003 report of the Trade
CounselÕs Office (BRH) of the Polish Embassy in
Chisinau entitled ÒDynamika procesw gospodarczych
w Republice Mo¸dowyÓ, p. 8.
** Source: The 1999 report of the Trade CounselÕs
Office (BRH) of the Polish Embassy in Kyiv, ed. Dr
Maria Bogacka, p. 4.
MoldovaÕs exports
2002*
2001
1998**
1995**
From the
European
Union
26.9%
27.6%
26.2%
13.7%
From Central
and Eastern
European
Countries
19%
25.3%
23.2%
14.1%
From the
NIS
39.1%
37.9%
43.4%
67.7%
Source: Anatoly Gudym, Respublika Moldova
i Evropeiski Soyuz kak partniory, Chisinau, 2002, p. 47.
* Source: The February 2003 report of the Trade
CounselÕs Office (BRH) of the Polish Embassy in
Chisinau entitled ÒDynamika procesw gospodarczych
w Republice Mo¸dowyÓ, p. 8.
** Source: The 1999 report of the Trade CounselÕs
Office (BRH) of the Polish Embassy in Kyiv, ed. Dr
Maria Bogacka, p. 4.
MoldovaÕs imports
value of Moldovan exports. However, 95 percent
of Moldovan nationals employed abroad work
illegally.
Various sources quote different numbers of Mol-
dovans working abroad: from 150Ð190 thousand
to 600 thousand, and even to 1 million. Since the
estimated size of the working age population in
right-bank Moldova (the separatist Transnistria
is not included in the statistics) is 1.65 million
people, and since reports claim that migration is
taking place on a massive scale, while the most
conservative estimates are based on the hardly
reliable official data, the actual number of mi-
grants may be around 600 thousand people37.
Most Moldovan emigrants work in Russia, but
large numbers of them are employed in the EU
Member States such as Italy or Portugal, and in
the candidate country, Romania. Moldova and
Italy signed an agreement on migrants in 2003,
which sets forth the quotas of Moldovans that
are allowed to work legally in Italy, provides for
basic legal assistance to the Moldovans, and in-
troduces readmission. Moldova and Portugal are
currently negotiating a similar agreement. The
problem of job migration is one of the main are-
as of the EUÕs interest as far as its relations with
Moldova are concerned.
Another important issue from the EUÕs point of
view is the existence of a transit route for illegal
migration from the Near East, South and South
Eastern Asia and the NIS, which runs through
Moldova. Having travelled across Moldova, the
migrants cross the Romanian border and head to
Western European countries. Migrants from So-
uth Eastern Asia have been reported to use Mol-
dovan passports. The Moldovan migration route
has been particularly active ever since Poland ti-
ghtened its eastern border. The number of refu-
gees from the East who transit through Moldova
is difficult to estimate. According to official sour-
ces, the security and border services have detec-
ted and expelled more than 15 thousand illegal
migrants from the East since 19923 8. The number
of undetected cases remains unknown.
To address these problems, the European Union
has called on Moldova to tighten its eastern and
western borders, and has financed a number of
programmes to this end, including the TACIS-
-C BC (Cross Border Co-operation) and PHARE-C BC
in particular39. Moreover, foreign ministries of
the Member States and Moldova have been co-
-operating on this issue. The co-operation be-
tween the EU and Moldova on the tightening of
borders is of crucial importance.
2.7. Summary
In the initial period of the MoldovaÐEU relations
(1991Ð1995), the two parties established mutual
contacts and defined an interim framework for
their relations (under the Trade and Co-o p e r a t i o n
A g reement concluded between the Euro p e a n
Communities and the Soviet Union). Then mutual
relations were deepened, mainly through the si-
g n a t u re of the Partnership and Co-o p e r a t i o n
A g reement in 1994. At that moment the existen-
ce of an independent Moldova was also re a f f i r-
med Ð the re f e rendum on the possible union with
Romania proved to be a decisive victory of the 
advocates of independence. As a result, Bru s s e l s
ceased to view Moldova as a seasonal country.
During President Petru LucinschiÕs term, Moldo-
va made some progress towards convincing the
EU to acknowledge its integration aspirations.
However, due to the difficult situation and the
country being insufficiently prepared, and be-
cause of the line of the European UnionÕs policy,
Chisinau did not manage to convince Brussels to
enter talks concerning the conclusion of an asso-
ciation agreement (a European Agreement). The
country did manage to join the Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe, though, as a result of its
governmentÕs policy. Paradoxically, this took pla-
ce while the pro-Russian communists were in
power. The communists, who came to power in
early 2001, had initially intended to incorporate
Moldova into the Belarus-Russia Union State, di-
splayed a pro-Moscow orientation, and opted for
integration within the post-Soviet space. With
time, however, they began to work towards clo-
ser integration with the European Union, while
at the same time preserving close ties with the
NIS. The pro-integration endeavours of the pre-
sent ruling team are reinforced by political dec-
larations about their will to integrate with the
EU and the formal invitation for the Union to jo-
in the Transnistrian negotiations process. At the
same time, however, this policy is far from con-
sistent, as evidenced by declarations of quitting
the CIS, which Moldova continues to make and
repeal. Additionally, the countryÕs international
prestige is low due to the weakness and corrup-
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tion of the apparatus of power40, the lowest per
capita GDP in Europe, and MoldovaÕs shaken
image in terms of the respect for human rights
and adherence to democratic principles41. All
these problems are stumbling blocks that pre-
vent Chisinau succeeding in its policy of rappro-
chement with the EU.
II. PROSPECTS OF THE
EUÐMOLDOVA RELAT I O N S
1. Co-operation prospects
C h i s i n a u Õ s ambitious integration plans are hard l y
realistic, as far as MoldovaÕs accession is concer-
ned, at least in the medium term perspective. 
It is also unclear if and when Moldova may gain
a chance to establish an association with the Eu-
ropean Union. In this situation, mutual relations
should be developed based on the New Neighbour-
hood Ð Wider Europe projects of the EU, which
target the UnionÕs old and new neighbours. By
mid 2004, Moldova should expect to sign the Ac-
tion Plan42, whose object is to establish closer
co-operation between Chisinau and Brussels.
The Action Plan deals with five areas including
political co -operation, the inclusion of Moldova
into the single European market, judicial and po-
lice co-operation, development of transport,
energy and communication infrastructure ne-
tworks, and cultural exchange. The European
Commission also intends to propose to create
a special assistance fund for its neighbours to
deal with cross-border undertakings. This fund
is to be created by 2007, i.e. by the date of Roma-
n i a Õ s p rojected accession. Rapprochement is
expected to take place principally through the
gradual inclusion of neighbours into the single
European market and their simultaneous ada-
ptation to European standards, mutual liberali-
sation of customs, and implementation of the
free movement of goods, services, capital and
people. However, Commission officials emphasi-
se that it may take 15Ð20 years to fully expand
the single market into the neighbour countries4 3.
In the meantime, Chisinau has come up with the
proposal for Moldova to join the Stabilisation
and Association Process (SAP)44, a programme
the Union has offered to the Balkan countries.
Chisinau perceives this concept as a Òfast trackÓ
towards integration with the EU and a way to
gain access to funds provided by the Union and
other donors to the Balkan countries. So far, ho-
wever, Brussels has not given a nod to this ini-
tiative.
2. Re c o m m e n d a t i o n s
The EU will certainly have to continue providing
humanitarian, macroeconomic and other assi-
stance to Moldova.
1) Economic support, such as the lifting of cu-
stom duties on wines, can make a great differen-
ce for this poorest country in Europe. To conti-
nue the example of wine: it is MoldovaÕs chief
export commodity, and if the EU market were
opened to it, this could decisively improve the
condition of MoldovaÕs economy. At the same ti-
me, European wine manufacturers probably wo-
uld not experience a significant increase in com-
petitive pressure, since the potential of Moldo-
vaÕs wine industry is small. Another form of as-
sistance of value to Moldova could be business
organisation know-how and new technologies.
2) Political initiatives should aim chiefly to make
the state apparatus more efficient and to combat
organised crime. Assistance should also be pro-
vided to the development of the civil service (in-
troduced in Moldova in 1995). Programmes for
the elimination of corruption, contraband, and
dishonest officials and their mafia affiliations
are also much needed (special attention should
be paid to the links between officials in Moldova
proper and those in Transnistria).
3 ) We l f a re initiatives are particularly needed in
a reas such as healthcare, development of the ci-
vil society, and the struggle against unemploy-
ment. Even if unemployment is not particularly
high in Moldova, this is only due to the huge
numbers of Moldovans emigrating for jobs. If the
number of Moldovan nationals working illegally
in the EU is to be reduced, they should be offere d
opportunities to start business or career activi-
ties in their own country. Another valuable initia-
tive could be to award grants to gifted young pe-
ople and students.
4) On its part, Moldova will have to get involved
in projects to combat crime (including illegal mi-
gration), and remedy the state apparatus defi-
ciencies such as corruption, incompetence of of-
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ficials, etc. It will also have to reinvigorate the
economy and end the conflict over Transnistria,
which breeds instability and crime in the region.
It is reasonable to believe that if the Moldovan si-
de were informed of the specific re q u i rements it
has to meet in order to be eligible to sign an as-
sociation agreement with the EU, this could be-
come a potent stimulus for reforms in the coun-
t ry and an effective instrument in the EUÕs p o l i-
cy towards Chisinau.
3. The problem of Tr a n s n i s t r i a
vs. MoldovaÐEU co-operation
The European Union is interested in the situ-
ation of the conflict over Transnistria because it
has to step up ÒhardÓ and ÒsoftÓ security in the
future south-eastern outskirts of the Union. The
problems it has to deal with include illegal mi-
gration, insufficient border controls, contra-
band, including trafficking in people, drugs and
weapons, and organised crime. As a result, co-
operation is necessary between the police for-
ces, legislators and secret services of the Union,
some EU Member States and Moldova. The ce-
ase-fire between Moldova and the separatist re-
public should also be monitored. The long-term
goal should be to settle the conflict and create
a united Moldovan Federation.
There are three aspects to the EUÕs projected in-
volvement in the attempts to solve the Transni-
strian problem: 
(1) the role the EU may play in negotiations, 
(2) participation of an EU contingent in the pe-
acekeeping forces safeguarding the settlement
agreement, and
(3) the UnionÕs participation in initiatives to bu-
ild confidence between the two sides of the con-
flict and to ensure the stability of the prospecti-
ve united Moldovan Federation.
The European Union was officially invited to join
the negotiations by President Vladimir Voronin
on 11 September 2003. The EU Institute for
Security Studies has suggested that the Union
should get involved in the negotiations. The EU,
however, maintains that there is no need to
change the existing five-party format of negotia-
tions, which includes Moldova, Transnistria, the
OSCE, Russia and Ukraine. The reason is that
Brussels does not want to irritate Russia, a coun-
try that has been highly suspicious of the NATO
and EU enlargement processes. Probably, howe-
ver, Brussels does unofficially influence the cour-
se of negotiations. European experts officially
provide consultative support to the works of the
Joint Constitutional Commission in charge of
drafting the constitution of the projected united
Moldovan Federation. More importantly, the
Union is calling for Russian troops to be with-
drawn from Transnistria as soon as possible. On
17 October 2003, the European Council called on
Russia to evacuate its troops within the agreed
deadline, i.e. by the end of 2003. Subsequently,
during the OSCE summit in Maastricht on 1Ð2 De-
c e m b e r 2003, the Member States criticised Rus-
sia for failing to withdraw its troops. Shortly 
before the summit, the EU impeded RussiaÕs
attempt to settle the conflict without Western
participation and to transform Moldova into a de
facto Russian protectorate (the Kozak Plan45).
Russia and TransnistriaÕs reluctance to have the
European Union play a role in the negotiations
will probably restrain the scope of the EUÕs acti-
vities in the future. Both sides are able to invali-
date the other partyÕs efforts they deem unfavo-
urable, but they cannot carry out their own so-
lutions.
The EU should call on Russia to withdraw all of
its forces from Transnistria as soon as possible.
It is necessary to keep working towards a com-
promise with Russia and the separatists, under
which the conflict may be ended. If no settle-
ment agreement is reached, which is unlikely,
the idea of the EUÕsdirect involvement in the ne-
gotiations should be considered again. The EU
should also press Ukraine to make sure that Ky-
iv abides by the agreements concluded with Chi-
sinau and stops goods produced by companies
not registered in Moldova at its borders. In addi-
tion, Brussels should persuade Kyiv to accept the
proposal presented by Chisinau to create joint
Moldovan-Ukrainian customs and border posts
in Ukrainian territory, along the Transnistrian
section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.
Tiraspol should be pressed to admit internatio-
nal inspectors to weapons factories in the sepa-
ratist republic and the Russian arms depots still
present in Transnistria (in the latter case, the
permission of the Russians will also be required).
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An EU contingent may participate in the peace-
keeping forces safeguarding the final agreement,
provided that the negotiations succeed, which is
not certain yet. Although works are progressing
at the Joint Constitutional Commission, which
was expected to present a draft constitution of
the united Moldovan Federation in early 2004,
there are some serious discrepancies over deta-
iled provisions of the projected constitution. Mo-
reover, it will take political will on both banks of
the Dniester to implement the constitution and
create a joint state, and such political will seems
to be missing. It is known for sure that the ear-
ly 2004 deadline will not be kept. If the negotia-
tions continue for much longer, it might be po-
ssible to introduce EU troops into the existing
peacekeeping contingent composed of Russian,
Moldovan and Transnistrian divisions. This, ho-
wever, will certainly inspire protests on the part
of the separatists and Russia. Undoubtedly, both
Moscow and Tiraspol are and will continue to be
opposed to the introduction of EU troops to the
conflict region in any situation, even if an agre-
ement settling the conflict is reached. Therefore,
all proposals presented by the EU should refer to
a peacekeeping force that includes a Russian
contingent.
The only risk-free contribution that the EU can
make to the negotiations consists in program-
mes which aim to build confidence between the
two sides of the conflict, develop democracy,
and promote the knowledge of and respect for
human rights in the authoritarian Transnistria.
EU experts should continue to provide consulta-
tive support to the negotiations, and the scope
of such support should be expanded.
Programmes to safeguard the stability and effi-
cient functioning of the prospective Moldovan
Federation will only become feasible once the
unification treaty is concluded.
III. CONCLU S I O N S
As a result of the enlargement process, Moldova
will find itself closer to the EUÕs external bor-
ders. In 2007, when Romania is expected to join
the Union, these two dissimilar political organi-
sms will become direct neighbours. It is therefo-
re necessary to better define the EUÕs policy to-
wards Moldova, and MoldovaÕs policy towards
the Community. In its own best interest, the Eu-
ropean Union should buttress MoldovaÕs weak
statehood. Unstable, the country may pose
a threat to the security of the UnionÕs south-
-eastern outskirts. The most important issue that
needs to be solved is the frozen Transnistrian
conflict, but Moldova is also coping with other
problems. Hence the CommunityÕs assistance is
of vital importance. On its part, Moldova should
tighten its borders and combat organised crime,
contraband, trafficking in humans, and illegal
migration.
Jacek Wrbel
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